Ukraine’s survival has been based on its courage for almost four years. This courage stopped Russian columns near Kyiv and blunted the early offensives. It also held a line of more than 1,000 kilometers.
Wars this long do not respond to only courage. Ukrainian soldiers have shown a willingness to fight.
The state must supply sufficient men, ammunition, air defense, and money to prevent the war tilting against them.
The numbers have become increasingly difficult to understand.
Infantry problems that will not go away
The most serious military deficit in Ukraine is the infantry. Infantry that can be rotated, rested, and returned to the front.
According to multiple independent sources, Ukrainian troops are now holding their positions for far too long with too few men and with insufficient relief.
According to reports, Russian forces outnumber Ukrainians in some areas of the front by up to ten-to-one.
The ratios have been cited by the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky as being three to one in general and eight to one near key centers like Pokrovsk.
Official statistics show the human costs. Since 2022, Ukrainian prosecutors opened thousands of cases involving absence without leave and desertion.
The exact number may vary depending on the source but the general trend is that more than half these cases have been recorded since 2025.
Some brigades on the front line are so thinly staffed that their commanders have to accept deserters returning just to fill in trenches.
This has been made worse by drone warfare. Rotations are now more deadly than static positions. It is more dangerous to move men around than stay put.
The drones are more powerful than ever. Soldiers stay in the front line for long periods of time.
Two Ukrainian soldiers held a position under continuous fire for 165 consecutive days.
Ammunition determines who will bleed
The side with the most firepower will win the war faster than the one that has the least ideas. The vast majority of casualties in battle are caused by artillery and rockets.
Artillery is estimated to cause up to 80 percent of casualties, although the precise number matters less than its effect.
The number of Ukrainians killed by artillery is increasing dramatically.
According to a report from late 2024, when Ukrainian forces were required to reduce daily artillery firing by 10,000 rounds per day, the number of deaths daily tripled.
Simple is the mechanism. Russian infantry is able to move more freely with fewer shells. Ukrainian infantry will then have to absorb the advance using their bodies, instead of steel.
Western production is still behind. US production of 155mm rounds was about 40,000 per month by mid-2024, and it is not expected to hit the promised one hundred thousand shells per month before mid-2026.
Europe’s production has increased, but it is not enough to eliminate rationing. Ukrainian commanders are delaying counterattacks due to the high cost of ammunition.
The damage is compounded by the lack of air defence. Weaker interceptors translate into more effective Russian attacks on the energy infrastructure. This leads to blackouts and lost industrial production, as well as a diminished rear economy, which must pay for soldiers and manufacture drones.
The air defence of cities is important, but it’s also vital to the functioning of the nation.
The Russian advantage lies in endurance
Russia’s performance on the battlefield is still costly and slow. Its strategic positioning is more clear. Moscow’s economy has been reshaped solely for war.
The defence budget is currently around 7 to 8 percent of the GDP. According to reports, the military consumes almost 40% of federal budget.
Even after price controls and sanctions, energy exports fund about a third or more of the state’s revenues.
Russia is a major producer of drones, shells and missiles.
The importation of technology and products from China, Iran and North Korea is used to supplement the domestic production.
Western analysts are increasingly in agreement that Russia, barring a major internal shock, can continue its war efforts for a few more years.
It is important to note that attrition favors the party who can continue paying. Russia is able to absorb greater losses due to its larger population and deeper mobilisation pool.
Ukraine can’t replace casualties as fast.
Each month that Kyiv delays stabilizing funding and supplies, the scales shift slightly against it.
Budgets built on the basis of hope and not cash
The budget for Ukraine 2026 exposes financial stress more than a battlefield map.
The projected revenues are approximately $69bn. Spending is expected to be around $114bn.
More than one quarter of the GDP is spent on defence and national security.
The cost of debt servicing alone is over 12 billion dollars.
The Ministry of Defence’s allocation has been reduced from 2025. The funding for the maintenance of the armed services has fallen by almost $5bn (in hryvnias). The budget for weapons acquisition and modernisation has also been reduced.
The pattern is similar to that of 2024 or 2025 when budgets were initially wildly overestimated and then had to be revised upward multiple times as the war cost increased.
Ukraine’s Finance Ministry estimates the country will require about $49.bn of external assistance in 2026.
This is approximately 43% of the total expenditure. IMF estimates that the financing gap between 2026-2027 is $60 billion.
The new IMF programme could deliver more than $8 billion over four years. The IMF program is certainly helpful, but it does not solve all the problems.
Zelensky was blunt in his remarks to European leaders. Ukraine’s drone production will be cut if it does not receive new funding before spring.
Ukraine’s manpower deficit is offset by drones. If Ukraine loses this edge, the spiral of attrition will accelerate.
Europe’s Late but Telling Choice
The struggle of Europe over Ukraine’s financing has exposed the limits to which it can go.
Months ago, EU leaders discussed using Russian frozen assets as collateral for a major loan. The plan was killed by legal risks, internal divisions and, in particular, Belgium where the majority of assets were held.
Instead, a EUR90bn credit was created, backed up by EU budget funds that were unused.
The result is more important than the process for Ukraine. Money will be available sooner under this plan than the one abandoned and it may help prevent a liquidity crisis in spring.
The significance of the deal for Europe is greater. It was agreed on without unanimous consent and allowed for states to opt out. This sets a precedent.
The EU has shown that it can create shared financial powers to achieve security objectives under pressure.
Even so, 90 billion Euros is not enough to cover Ukraine’s entire needs until 2027. The volume of aid has dropped dramatically in recent months.
Kyiv, without further commitments will be forced to operate on short-term planning horizons and will not be able to secure contracts for equipment, ammunition, or air defense at the level required by the war.
The end result is that Europe has become irrelevant in the outcome of this war because its diplomatic rhetoric was not matched with enough financial and military strength.
Influence is based on money and arms. Ukraine’s dependence on Europe is growing.
If there are no structural changes made, then 2026 will be the inflection point for Ukraine. The front may hold, but Kyiv’s ability to avoid operational disruptions and negotiate with strength will diminish.
The post This is why 2026 may decide Ukraine’s War as Manpower and Resources are Running Low will be updated as new developments unfold.
