The US-Israel relationship has been a cornerstone of American foreign policies for 60 years. But that may soon change.
Was once described as a “strategic partnership” now appears to be a state-backed agreement that cost Israel over $300 billion dollars in US aid.
Israel has maintained its military advantage over all of its neighbours with the US’ annual military funding, which amounts to $3.8 billion. The US also deployed their own forces in order to intercept Iranian missiles that were aimed at Israeli cities.
This tension was re-emerging in public disputes over gas fields, the resignation of a counterterrorism chief and a statement by an American President that his closest ally had acted before consulting him.
It is not enough to ask whether Israel has an ally status, the bigger question is whether this relationship is one of dependence, with Washington subsidising Israel and American taxpayers underwriting it.
The US will coordinate a multi-national air defense coalition in April 2024 to specifically protect Israel against Iranian ballistic rockets.
The American forces themselves intercepted about half of the second Iranian barrage in October 2024.
These episodes highlighted something often overlooked in flattering political coverage. The alliance is more than a diplomatic agreement. It is a significant, ongoing economic commitment that has direct effects on the fiscal, energy, industrial and market markets.
The US gains intelligence-sharing, a military foothold in the region, and real technology partnerships.
The burden to underwrite a relationship of security whose real benefits but uneven distribution are very high is also received.
Relationships have always been based on real strategy.
Washington has been comfortable for years with this asymmetry. This bipartisan basis is now crumbling, in a way that can’t be repaired. The economics of this alliance also aren’t easy to ignore.
What changed on Oct. 7?
The attack by Hamas on October 7, 2023, triggered a period of intense US military support to Israel ever since its founding.
The Biden Administration stepped up aid, offered diplomatic protection, and stood publicly firm.
In private, there was a much more fractious relationship.
Resignation of senior officials at the State Department Democrats started voting against weapons packages.
By early 2026, American support for Israel fell from 60% to just 36%, the lowest level recorded in many decades.
In a 2025 Quinnipiac survey, six out of ten American respondents opposed the continuation of military aid to Israel.
Once automatic, votes by Congress on the sale of arms to Israel are now contested. This shift is important because aid cannot be abstracted.
The money is right, as are the defence purchases, industrial assistance, and an ongoing line item that’s tied into a larger system where Washington takes on risk and Israel gets a level backing few other allies could match.
Trump made his alliance with Israel personal when he returned to power in 2025. He demanded that Israeli courts drop the corruption allegations against Netanyahu and interrupted a speech at the Knesset to ask for a pardon from the president.
Do the two countries share similar goals in their war against Iran?
Operation Epic Fury was launched on February 28th, 2026 as a US-Israeli campaign that had clear goals.
It was revealed within three weeks that both countries were fighting different wars, with major implications for economic and military matters.
Trump stated that his goals are to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program and ballistic missile capabilities, as well as its navy.
Israel wanted to permanently change the regional order, decapitate Iran’s leadership and dismantle their industrial base.
Tulsi Gabriel, Trump’s director of national intelligence, told Congress this in plain English.
The objectives of the US president are not the same as those set by the Israeli government.
This sentence was spoken by an official of the administration under oath. It is perhaps the most accurate public description in recent years of the structural problems in the alliance, as it revealed a division not only in terms in strategy, but also in the expected costs, the risk tolerance and the end state economics.
It was crystallised in the South Pars Strike.
According to Trump, Israel had bombed a gas field that was one of the largest in the world without first telling him. Israeli officials dispute that.
The contradictions between the allies that were played out simultaneously on Truth Social, and at press conferences, sent oil markets spiraling and made Gulf States furious.
The statement reminded policymakers and investors that the new alliance has direct implications for the commodity price, shipping insurance and regional investments, as well as the cost to do business in an unstable Middle East.
Oman’s Foreign Minister wrote that America was dragged into war while diplomacy still existed.
He said, “This war is not America’s.”
Joe Kent, Trump’s former director of Trump’s National Counterterrorism Center resigned, and claimed that Israel and the powerful American lobby had pushed the US into a conflict. This is not a fringe opinion.
How does the alliance look from here?
There are deep military and intelligence links between Israel and the US that will never be broken by a single war.
The institutional connections built by technology partnerships, cyber security cooperation, integration of the defence industry, and joint networks for research have outlasted any crisis.
These ties create constituencies for both parties, from intelligence agencies to manufacturers and contractors. This helps explain the persistence of the alliance, even as public trust dwindles.
Israel exported $14.7 billion worth of defence products in 2024. Most of these were to Europe. This shows that Israel is becoming more independent on the global stage.
This is important economically, because it shows that Israel has become more than just a recipient of security. It’s also an exporter of arms and a defence innovator.
The relationship between the United States and Israel is more than just a support of a weak ally. It is also an avenue through which Israeli technology, defence capabilities, and industrial partnership feeds back to global markets.
The political base of the Alliance has never been more fragile.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently noted that the fissures in traditionally pro-Israel American communities “may not heal quickly” and may outlast Netanyahu.
This warning also has a subtext of economics: if a relationship is dependent on sustained political subsidies, then the erosion of support from both parties increases the costs of maintaining the relationship and the probability that any future assistance will be subject to more scrutiny, stricter conditions or even opposition.
It isn’t Trump, Netanyahu or other decisions made over the last three weeks that are at root of this problem.
The biggest problem with the alliance is the fact that it was built under the presumption that Israelis and Americans had fundamentally similar interests.
This assumption has held true throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror, as well as through many cycles of Middle East instabilities.
It was tested in a manner that has never been seen before, forcing both nations to bear real and measurable costs in perpetuity for an objective they were never entirely in agreement on.
It is still a special relationship. The relationship is still there, but it’s not free.
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